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ABSTRACT 
Many countries have recognized the need to revive agricultural advisory or extension services (the terms 
are used interchangeably here) as a means of using agriculture as an engine of pro-poor growth; reaching 
marginalized, poor, and female farmers; and addressing new challenges, such as environmental 
degradation and climate change. In spite of ample experience with extension reform worldwide, 
identifying the reform options most likely to make extension more demand-driven remains a major 
challenge. The concept of demand-driven services implies making extension more responsive to the needs 
of all farmers, including women and those who are poor and marginalized. It also implies making 
extension more accountable to farmers and, as a consequence, more effective.  
  This essay discusses various options for providing and financing agricultural advisory services, 
which involve the public and private sectors as well as a third sector comprising nongovernmental 
organizations and farmer-based organizations. We review the market and state failures, and the 
“community” failures (failures of non-governmental and farmer-based organizations) inherent in existing 
models of providing and financing agricultural extension services and then outline strategies to address 
those failures and make extension demand-driven. Then we examine India’s Policy Framework for 
Agricultural Extension, which has demand-driven extension as one of its major objectives, and review 
available survey information on the state of extension in India. We conclude that although the framework 
proposes a wide range of strategies to make agricultural extension demand-driven, it is less specific in 
addressing the challenges inherent in those strategies. Moreover, it remains unclear whether the strategies 
proposed in the framework will be able to address one of the major problems identified by farm 
household surveys: access to agricultural extension. 
Key words: Demand-driven agricultural advisory services; extension reform; India 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
In recent years, many developing countries have reaffirmed the essential role that agricultural extension 
can play in agricultural development (Birner et al. 2006; Anderson 2007). This renewed interest in 
extension is linked to the rediscovery of the role that agriculture needs to play in reducing persistent rural 
poverty (World Bank 2007b). Yet negative experiences with extension in the past have sparked 
considerable debate worldwide about the best way to provide and finance agricultural extension. What are 
the roles of the public sector, the private sector, and the third sector—nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) and farmer-based organizations—in providing and financing extension? How will the 
agricultural sector meet new challenges, such as helping smallholders access global markets and meet 
their standards? How can farmers cope with environmental degradation and climate change and respond 
to health challenges such as livestock pandemics? How can extension address the needs of women 
farmers and disadvantaged groups? What are the best uses of new information and communication 
technologies? All these questions are highly relevant for agricultural development in India (see, e.g., Vyas 
2003). 
In addition, agricultural extension faces the challenge of establishing a well-managed, effective, 
and accountable system that meets the needs of hundreds of thousands of farmers engaged in diverse and 
complex farming systems; the associated problems of monitoring and evaluating extension services and 
assessing their impacts; the dependence of extension on the performance of the agricultural research 
system and its feedback linkages; and the inherent problems of ensuring political commitment and fiscal 
accountability for agricultural extension (Feder, Willett, and Zijp 2001). 
The way in which agricultural extension has been organized and provided to meet these 
challenges has changed over time, with remarkably similar trends across the globe. These changes have 
been linked to general trends in development thinking and practice. A strong belief in the role of the 
state—as the major actor of development—characterized the economic policies of many developing 
nations after they reached their independence. The establishment of public sector extension services fitted 
well into this paradigm. The Training and Visit (T&V) system, promoted by the World Bank in more than 
50 countries, became a major model for providing and managing extension (Purcell and Anderson, 1997; 
Anderson, Feder, and Ganguly 2006). The disenchantment with the role of the state in development—
reflected in the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s—led to a downsizing of 
agricultural extension in many countries. The T&V system was finally abandoned in the late 1990s. The 
question remains whether the major reason was the lack of fiscal sustainability, the inadequacy of the 
model for many situations in which it was promoted, or its inconsistency with the growing emphasis on 
the role of the state as a facilitator rather than a provider of public services.   2
In the post-T&V era, thinking and practice about extension has moved toward pluralistic modes 
of providing and financing extension (Neuchâtel Group 2000; Birner et al. 2006). Major reform trends 
around the world include decentralization, contracting, privatization, cost recovery, and the involvement 
of NGOs and farmer-based organizations (Rivera and Alex 2005). Emphasis is now placed on making 
advisory services demand-driven (Neuchâtel Group 2006). The emphasis on demand-driven extension has 
to be seen in the context of changing domestic and external environments for agriculture, which change 
the information needs of farmers. In addition to information on new technologies, advice on marketing, 
product quality, and environmental challenges has become increasingly important (Sulaiman and Hall 
2002).  
The concept of demand-driven services is also linked to a paradigm shift in public sector reform 
toward responsive governance (UN/AF 2005). This paradigm emphasizes the need to make service 
provision accountable to users and to promote transparency and empowerment as essential conditions for 
increasing the effectiveness of public service provision. Thus, the focus on demand-driven service 
provision is not limited to agricultural extension: A similar emphasis can be observed in many other 
sectors. Efforts to make health care, education, and community water supplies demand-driven are also 
under way. 
These general trends in agricultural extension can be observed in India. The T&V system played 
an important role in the Green Revolution. However, it was not well suited for the diverse farming system 
of rainfed areas and proved incapable of meeting the challenges of the post–Green Revolution period, 
including improving the sustainability of India’s farming systems, promoting agricultural diversification, 
and integrating farmers into dynamic markets (Vyas 2003). As in other countries, many new approaches 
to providing and financing extension have been tried in India’s post-T&V era (e.g., Sulaiman 2003). In 
2000, the Extension Division of the Department of Agriculture and Cooperation of the Ministry of 
Agriculture developed a draft of its Policy Framework for Agricultural Extension, which aimed for a 
major reform and reorientation of India’s entire agricultural extension system. In line with the shifting 
international paradigm, the framework emphasizes pluralistic agricultural extension and the “promotion 
of demand-driven and farmer-accountable extension” (Government of India 2000, sec. 3.3.1.5). It served 
as a basis for consultations with state governments and private sector organizations such as the Federation 
of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Sulaiman and Hall 2006). The document serves as the 
basis for India’s extension policy and guides both internally and externally funded programs through 
which the government supports the states in their extension reform efforts.
1 
                                                      
1 D. Umali-Deininger, personal communication, June 2007. Since agriculture is the responsibility of the states in India’s 
federal system, state governments could use the framework, or elements of it, to reform their laws. However, this has not 
happened (R.V. Sulaiman, personal communication, July 2007).   3
The objective of this essay is to discuss various strategies for making agricultural extension 
demand-driven, using India’s Policy Framework for Agricultural Extension as an example. For this 
purpose, we develop a system for classifying options for providing and financing agricultural extension 
that involves the public, private, and third sectors. Each sector is subject to a unique set of challenges and 
failures. As our discussion shows, market failures, state failures, and community failures are widespread 
in agricultural extension. Various approaches address these failures, but they too are subject to challenges. 
In other words, there is no “free lunch” in reforming agricultural extension.  
We review India’s Policy Framework for Agricultural Extension with regard to the strategies it 
identifies to make extension demand-driven, and we examine the provisions the framework makes to 
overcome market, state, and community failures. We also consider evidence from the 2003 Situation 
Assessment Survey of Farmers conducted by India’s National Sample Survey Organization (2005) and 
other data to identify the extent to which the framework actually addresses the problems revealed by the 
survey. Because other public services are also attempting to become more demand-driven, the relevance 
of our findings goes beyond agricultural extension services.   4
2.  CONCEPT OF DEMAND-DRIVEN SERVICES 
The term demand-driven refers to the economic concepts of supply and demand. In economic theory, 
demand refers to the amount of good or service that a consumer is willing and able to buy at a given price. 
As discussed later in this essay, agricultural extension is characterized by various market failures that 
affect both the supply side and the demand side of advisory services. In view of these market failures, the 
public sector and the third sector have traditionally played a major role in financing and providing 
extension services. In this paper, the third sector is defined as comprising civil society organizations, 
including farmer-based organizations and NGOs. Among the NGOs, non-profit providers of extension 
services are of particular interest. In the absence of the market mechanism, public and third sector 
extension providers face considerable challenges to ensuring that the services they supply meet the needs 
and the priorities of their clients. The term supply driven captures the criticism that this challenge has not 
been met. The T&V system, for example, is typically described as a supply-driven or top-down model. 
The concept of demand-driven extension emphasizes the need to provide services that meet the 
needs and priorities of farmers, even if the market mechanism—Adam Smith’s famous “invisible hand”—
fails to make sure that extension services are supplied in the quantity and quality expected by farmers. 
The term farmer-driven or farmer-led extension might better address the goal of making these services 
meet the needs and priorities of farmers, even if they are not able to exercise demand, as the term is 
defined in economics. 
Because agricultural extension is a major area of donor funding and demand-driven public 
services are high on the international agenda, it is not surprising that the Neuchâtel Group—an 
international donor coordination forum on agricultural extension—has published guidelines on demand-
driven agricultural advisory services (Neuchâtel Group 2006). The group’s publication recommends 
strategies to facilitate the emergence of a market for extension services and strategies to increase the voice 
of farmers when the public sector is financing and/or providing extension services. The publication also 
highlights the need to strengthen the capacity of farmers to articulate demand, as well as the capacity of 
service providers to respond to farmers’ demands. 
To establish demand-driven advisory services, it is useful to begin by identifying the extent to 
which market failures or other obstacles prevent the emergence of private sector extension services, 
which use the market mechanism to make services demand-driven. If an advisory service had no market 
failures and the market led to a socially desirable outcome, creating an environment in which the private 
or third sector could provide these services would be sufficient to make extension demand-driven. 
However, as discussed later in this essay, market failures in agricultural services are widespread. Hence,   5
the question arises as to how demand-driven, or farmer-driven, advisory services can be established when 
the market mechanism fails to make these services demand-driven. 
To identify strategies for making agricultural extension demand-driven, it is useful to consider the 
range of institutional options by which these services can be provided and financed, taking into account 
that organizations of the public, private, and third sectors can collaborate in various combinations. Table 1 
classifies the institutional options. 
Table 1. Options for providing and financing agricultural advisory services 
Financing of Service  Provision of 
Service  Public sector 
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Source: Adapted from Anderson and Feder (2004), Birner et al. (2006), and Rivera (1996) 
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3.  AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION IN INDIA: INSIGHTS FROM THE 2003 SITUATION 
ASSESSMENT SURVEY OF FARMERS 
Before discussing the provisions of India’s Policy Framework for Agricultural Extension, a brief 
overview of extension in India would be useful. Extension played an important role in promoting Green 
Revolution technologies, and the T&V system proved effective in the areas of India affected by the Green 
Revolution. However, it was less effective in the rainfed areas. There is a general perception that, after 
T&V was phased out in the 1990s, the existing extension system deteriorated, even though a variety of 
new approaches to provide and finance extension emerged (Sulaiman 2003; Sulaiman and Van den Ban 
2001). These approaches included decentralization; contracting; group extension; provision of extension 
by para-extension workers, producer cooperatives, or farmer-based organizations; the establishment of 
agro-clinics by private entrepreneurs with initial government support; public-private partnerships in 
financing and providing extension; and the establishment of Internet-based extension though village 
kiosks (e-Choupals) set up by the private sector. As detailed later in the essay, the Agricultural 
Technology Management Agency developed a model that embodies several of these reform elements. In 
view of low agricultural growth rates and a vigorous political debate about agrarian distress, the political 
attention to agricultural extension also was renewed. As one of the major “thrust areas” in agriculture, 
India’s 10th Five-Year Plan (2002–2007) emphasizes the need for “revamping and modernizing the 
extension systems and encouraging the private sector to take up extension services” (Government of India 
2002, 528). As indicated earlier, the national Policy Framework for Agricultural Extension was developed 
in 2000 to serve as the basis for the central government’s support to the states. In India’s federal system, 
the states have the major responsibility for agriculture, including agricultural extension. 
The 59th round of the Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers carried out by the National 
Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) in 2003 provides important information on the prevailing situation 
when the framework and the 10th plan were developed (NSSO 2005). Data for the survey, which is 
representative at the state level, were collected from 51,770 households in 6,638 villages. 
Figure 1 displays the information sources for modern technology used by farmers in India. 
Farmers were asked to identify which, if any, of the sources they had accessed during the past 365 days to 
obtain information on modern agricultural technology. Nearly 60 percent of the farmers had not accessed 
any sources. When farmers did use sources, the input dealer was the second-most-used source after other 
progressive farmers. Input dealers correspond to option 10 presented in Table 1. Output buyers, food 
processors, and credit agencies also fall in this category, if the respective companies are private sector 
entities. The government extension worker (option 1 in Table 1) ranked sixth, followed by the primary 
cooperative society, which corresponds to options 8 and 17 in Table 1. Less than 1 percent of Indian   7
farmers accessed NGOs (options 3, 7, and 13 in Table 1), private sector extension agencies (option 6 in 
Table 1), or para-technicians. 
Figure 1. Percentage of farmer households accessing information on modern agricultural 
technology through various sources 
 
Source: Derived from data reported in NSSO (2005, 7) 
Note: Krishi Vigyan Kendra refers to Farmer Information and Advisory Centres. 
The surveyed farmers were also asked to rank the quality of information received as good, 
satisfactory, or poor. Table 2 shows the results by state. About half of the farmers ranked the quality of 
information received from most of the information sources as good. There are, however, considerable 
differences across states. 
Figure 2 shows that the percentage of farm households who rated the quality of the information 
provided as poor was actually rather small for all types of information sources reported. 
% of households








0.2 Farmers’ study tour 
0.6 Para-technician/ private agency/NGO 
Krishi Vigyan Kendra
0.9 Participation in training 
1.7 Others
1.8 Credit agency
2.0 Village fair 
2.0
2.3 Output buyers/ food processor






Other progressive farmers   8
Table 2. Percentage of farmer households reporting good quality information on modern 
agricultural technology provided by various sources 








Andhra Pradesh  45.8  60.4  44.6  53.8  57.0  54.9 
Assam   30.5  40.1  36.4  47.8  28.4  24.8 
Bihar   10.4  45.4  53.0  47.8  59.2  59.4 
Chhattisgar 38.6  63.5  82.8  52.8  0.0  52.5 
Gujarat   60.3  73.7  59.2  56.4  73.4  66.4 
Haryana 59.8  59.5  65.4  60.8  54.1  60.4 
Jammu and Kashmir  18.0  44.6  36.6  49.8  8.4  52.1 
Jharlkhand 100.0  31.0  46.9  36.2  20.6  14.5 
Karnataka 48.0  64.7  54.6  54.3  53.1  53.6 
Kerala 51.0  60.6  62.1  62.3  70.6  57.7 
Madya Pradesh  42.1  66.2  62.5  57.4  51.9  34.6 
Maharashtra 48.3  57.8  54.2  53.1  45.3  56.1 
Orissa 57.3  48.4  46.2  43.8  26.0  24.4 
Punjab   51.6  67.8  63.4  70.5  44.8  85.5 
Rajasthan 70.8  63.6  58.7  71.0  42  42.5 
Tamil Nadu  78.7  69.2  68.8  64  70.7  68.5 
Utter Pradesh  35.9  55.2  63.6  54.4  52.9  58.6 
West Bengal  45.0  52.1  46.0 56.8  36.7  41.2 
India   51.1  59.0  55.5  55.9  50.5  52.8 
Source: NSSO (2005, 19) 
Figure 2. Farmer households’ satisfaction with the quality of information from various information 
sources 
 
Source: Derived from data reported in NSSO (2005, A-135)
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When asked to make suggestions for improvement, about one-third of the farmers mentioned 
improvement in the quality and reliability of the information provided (Table 3). For all information 
sources, this suggestion was more frequently mentioned than any other, including improved timeliness of 
information. 









Improvement in quality & 
reliability of information 
34.4 30.5  32.8  36.9  39.3  32.3 
Timeliness of information  20.1 18.6  19.9  18.0  12.8  12.3 
Increase in frequency of 
demonstration 
18 17.5  14.1 10.5 6.9  4.9 
Improvement of quality of 
presentation 
4.1 8.7  7.7  7.3  6.1  7.8 
Improvement of professional 
competence of information 
provider 
7.5 3.3  3.3  4.3  8.6  8.7 
Others  14.9 20.3  20.7  22.2  24.7  32.8 
All  100 100  100  100  100  100 
Source: NSSO (2005, 22) 
Table 4 presents the percentage of farmer households that tried the practices in modern 
agricultural technology recommended by various sources of information. The table also reports the 
percentage of farmers who adopted the practices, which might happen with or without trials. This 
tabulated information can reasonably be interpreted as an indication of the relevance of the information 
provided. 
Table 4. Percentage of farmer households trying and/or adopting recommended practices in 








Trying recommended practice  65.3 53.3  56.3  54.1  81.5  82.8 
Adopting recommended 
practice  62.5 53.1  54.5  53.8  81.7  85.1 
Source: Derived from data reported in NSSO (2005: 20-21) 
Table 5 reports membership in registered farmer-based organizations and in self-help groups. Only 
in Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu was more than 10 percent of the farmer households registered.   10
Table 5. Membership of farmer-based organizations 
% of Farmer Households 
with at Least One Person 
Belonging to: 
% of Farmer Households 


















Andhra Pradesh  2.4  17.7  Kerala  10.5  19.9 
Assam 7.0  8.2  Madya  Pradesh  0.8  2.7 
Bihar 0.3  0.8  Maharashtra  2.2  4.9 
Chhattis 2.4  6.5  Orissa  0.2  2.8 
Gujarat 5.9  3.2  Punjab  0.3  1.5 
Haryana 0.0  1.0  Rajasthan  0.4  0.6 
Jammu & Kashmir  0.6  0.2  Tamil Nadu  3.4  12.9 
Jharkha 0.2  2.8  Utter  Pradesh  1.0  1.5 
Karnata 5.2  8.1  West  Bengal  4.0  1.9 
     India 2.2  4.8 
NSSO (2005), quoted in Bhalla (2006, 4) 
The 2003 Situation Assessment of Farmers reveals several major challenges facing agricultural 
extension in India with regard to access and quality. More than one-half of the surveyed farmers did not 
access any information source on modern technology, only 6 percent had accessed a government extension 
worker, and less than 1 percent had accessed either NGO or private sector extension providers. The perceived 
quality of most of the information provided was rated as either good or satisfactory, but only around 60 
percent of the farmers actually tried the technologies recommended by extension workers. This points to 
problems regarding the practical relevance of the advice provided by extension agents. The survey also shows 
that the number of farmers organized in farmer-based organizations or self-help groups was low, except in the 
southern states of Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu. This implies that a considerable investment in 
social capital would be necessary to promote the involvement of farmer-based organizations in agricultural 
extension.   11
4.  APPROACHES TO MAKING AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION DEMAND-DRIVEN 
This section discusses the challenges of making various types of agricultural extension demand-driven 
and outlines strategies to meet these challenges. The provisions made in the Policy Framework for 
Agricultural Extension are then examined from this perspective. To identify the reasons for market 
failures, this section mainly draws on economic theory, while the broader agricultural extension literature 
is used as a basis for discussing the challenges and failures of the public and third sectors. The essay 
acknowledges that the analysis of demand-driven services is best approached from a multidisciplinary 
perspective. In particular, management sciences and the innovation systems literature, which focus on 
organizational learning, knowledge management, partnerships, and institutional change, can provide 
important analytical insights for approaches to make extension demand-driven. 
4.1.  Market-Based Extension 
As discussed earlier, in the absence of market failure, the market mechanism can make agricultural 
extension demand-driven. Option 6 in Table 1 represents this “pure” market-based case: Private sector 
extension agents are paid by the farmers to provide extension services. Option 10—companies provide 
advice together with the sale of their inputs or purchases of outputs—may also be considered a market-
based case. However, this kind of service does not necessarily cover all knowledge demands that farmers 
have, because it is usually limited to the products being purchased or sold. As discussed in section 3, the 
option-10 type of extension plays an important role in India, whereas the use of option 6—private 
extension agencies paid for by farmers—was very low. This suggests that market failures may play an 
important role. The following section discusses the factors that can lead to market failures in agricultural 
extension from a theoretical perspective. 
4.1.1. Market Failures in Agricultural Extension: Theoretical Considerations 
Reasons for market failures 
Market failure can be defined as the inability of a market production system to provide a good or service 
either at all or at a level that is optimal from the society’s perspective. Imperfections in the market 
mechanism can be caused by the nature of the goods to be provided or by positive and negative 
externalities. Market failures can affect both the supply side and the demand side of service provision 
(Umali and Schwartz, 1994; Bennett, 1995; Anderson and Feder 2007). 
One reason for market failures in extension is that some types of information are public goods. 
Knowledge that is not farm specific, such as information about prices, is considered a public good, 
especially if it is distributed using a nonexcludable technology, such as the radio. Information provided   12
through the Internet can be made excludable more easily—for example, by requiring that farmers become 
members of a group to access password-protected Web sites. This kind of service represents a club good. 
Farm-specific advice has the characteristics of a private good. With a private or club good, the nature of 
the good does not cause market failures. 
Market failures also occur if an extension service has the characteristics of a merit good—a good 
that consumers undervalue because of imperfect information. Lacking sufficient information about the 
value of extension, farmers are likely to demand less of it than is in their best interests. Extension services 
may also have the character of merit goods because of time-horizon problems. Poor farmers with a high 
time rate of discount may undervalue the benefits of extension if those benefits are only realized later. 
This problem is aggravated when the benefits of extension are perceived as uncertain and farmers are risk 
averse. While the nature of public goods leads to market failures on the supply side, the character of 
extension as a merit good leads to market failures on the demand side. 
Externalities are another reason for market failures. Extension is associated with positive 
externalities if the benefits of extension accrue partly to the society as a whole. An example is the use of 
extension for reaching national goals such as food security. Extension services also have positive 
externalities when they contribute to reducing the negative environmental effects of agricultural 
production. This can also be seen as the use of extension to reduce the negative externalities of 
agricultural production. Educating farmers about the negative environmental effects of production and 
promoting technologies that help avoid those effects will not necessarily lead to a full internalization of 
negative externalities (Pannell 2006; Pannell et al. 2006). The impact of education depends on the 
farmers’ environmental preferences, the differences between public and private costs, and the benefits of 
agricultural production systems that differ in their environmental impacts. The positive and negative 
externalities described here prevent market mechanisms alone from leading to a socially optimal 
provision of extension services because the private demand for them is insufficient. 
The characteristics of smallholder agriculture in developing countries may also lead to market 
failures. Because provision of extension is subject to economies of scale, providing extension services 
may be profitable for private entrepreneurs only if they can reach a sufficiently large number of farmers. 
Agricultural producers are more spatially dispersed than urban populations, and they often have a more 
limited access to transportation infrastructure. Moreover, they are often not organized in groups. As a 
result, the transaction costs of providing extension to smallholders in less-developed areas are typically 
high, and private sector organizations may not find it profitable to provide those services. In early phases 
of agricultural development, the same factors (spatial dispersion, lack of coordination, high transaction 
costs) also give rise to market failures in other agrarian institutions, such as agricultural credit and 
marketing (Binswanger and McIntire, 1987; Dorward et al. 2004). These market failures may lead to   13
associated market failures in extension. For example, farmers may not have access to credit to pay for 
extension services. These problems are usually reduced in the course of economic development, thus 
creating scope for market-based extension services to arise. In contrast, the market failures resulting from 
externalities and public goods are not dependent on the stage of economic development. 
Strategies to overcome market failures 
The market failures related to extension outlined in the previous section can be addressed through public 
sector intervention and collective action. These approaches are discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3. Market 
failures are not the only justification for the public sector to intervene in agricultural extension. As 
discussed in section 4.2, the state may choose to finance agricultural extension as a component of a 
poverty alleviation strategy. 
Institutions such as contract farming that primarily address market failures in agriculture other 
than those specific to extension may also provide a solution for extension. Extension services can be 
embedded in contracts that integrate farmers into value chains. It is not clear from the NSSO data 
presented in section 3 how widespread this option was in India in 2003, because the survey did not 
specify under which type of contractual arrangements farmers received advice from input dealers or 
output buyers. Whether embedded advisory services are demand-driven depends on the degree to which 
the farmers’ interests are aligned with the interests of the company offering the contract. 
4.1.2. Provisions in the Policy Framework for Agricultural Extension 
The framework acknowledges the relevance of market failures in agricultural extension by pointing out 
that “pure public goods, economically backward regions, small, marginal farmers and landless labourers 
will not attract the for-profit private sector. Public Extension will therefore continue to play a central role 
in technology dissemination” [3.3.1.3].
2 At the same time, the framework emphasizes the need for 
“withdrawal of the public sector from areas where agro-services can be effectively and competitively 
provided by the private sector” to make sure that public sector provision of extension does not crowd out 
private extension providers [3.3.1.8]. However, given that less than 6 percent of farmers used public 
sector extension agents as sources of information (Figure 1), it is doubtful that crowding out played a role 
in the low prevalence of private sector extension. Unlike in other policy areas, such as agricultural 
marketing, India has no government regulations preventing private extension providers from operating. 
The framework mentions artificial insemination services, soil testing, fertilizer advice, farm improvement 
plans, and breeding plans as examples of “private goods” for which competitive markets exist [3.3.1.8]. 
                                                      
2 In the remainder of this essay, the Policy Framework for Agricultural Extension is referenced by citing [in square brackets] 
the section number of the document posted on the Web site of the Department of Agriculture and Cooperation (Government of 
India 2000).   14
Moreover, the framework recommends using contract farming “wherever feasible,” particularly in the 
area of high-value and export-oriented agriculture [3.3.9.4]. 
4.2. Public Sector Extension 
In view of the market failures described in section 3, the public sector has traditionally played an 
important role in agricultural extension. Option 1 in Table 1 represents the “pure case” of public sector 
extension, which is financed by the state and provided by the staff of a public sector extension agency. 
This option corresponds to the “extension worker” category included in Table 2 and 3, as well as 
government demonstration plots and Krishi Vigayan Kendras (Farmer Information and Advisory 
Centres). Public sector interventions are subject to state failures, which are discussed from a theoretical 
perspective in the following section. 
4.2.1. State Failures in Agricultural Extension: Theoretical Considerations 
Reasons for state failures 
State failures in agricultural extension occur because of problems related to information, incentives, 
capacity, political interests, and bureaucratic procedures and attitudes. Although these problems are not 
specific to agricultural extension, the complexity of smallholder agriculture aggravates some of the 
typical public sector problems. From the perspective of the new institutional economics, agricultural 
extension is transaction intensive. Moreover, moving from the delivery of standardized messages to 
demand-driven advice makes extension more discretionary and specific. Public services that are both 
transaction intensive and discretionary are particularly difficult to provide (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004). 
Two types of information problems lead to state failures in agricultural extension. First, in the 
absence of a market mechanism, public sector extension providers have trouble determining the types of 
knowledge and advice farmers actually need. Making this determination is at the heart of making public 
sector extension demand-driven. An information problem that extension managers often face is the 
inability to determine what extension agents actually do in the field and to supervise them. Considerable 
information asymmetries exist between extension agents and their managers because of the spatially 
dispersed nature of agriculture and because an agricultural outcome, such as crop yields, are influenced 
by many factors, other than extension. 
Incentive problems also lead to state failures. Public sector agencies can use various instruments 
to create incentives, such as merit-based promotion. However, when public budgets do not keep pace with 
inflation and general improvements in standard of living, as is often the case, the possibilities to use a 
differentiated system of promotion associated with salary incentives deteriorate. In addition, extension 
agents often have a lower social status than many other public sector employees and a lower rank in the   15
civil service system, which affect their morale. Another factor affecting agents’ morale is that they do not 
have the operational funds they need to get to the field and work effectively. The incentive problems 
inherent in public sector extension agencies are closely linked with capacity problems. Public sector 
agencies often lack the incentives to invest in the capacity of their extension staff so as to keep their 
knowledge up-to-date. 
Another failure inherent in public sector extension is political interest capture. Because large-
scale farmers often have more political influence than smallholders, politicians have an incentive to 
induce the public administration to serve large-scale farmers and to concentrate on extension issues that 
are more relevant to them. Often the only government agents able to interact with a considerable part of 
the rural population, extension agents may be misused for political purposes, such as campaigning for the 
ruling parties in elections. 
Public sector extension agents are also often burdened with other activities that are outside the 
mandate of agricultural extension. For example, extension agents have frequently been involved in 
organizing the supply of subsidized inputs and implementing credit schemes. They may also be asked to 
get involved in implementing public health programs and other government schemes unrelated to 
agriculture. 
Corruption is not a typical problem in extension because knowledge services do not offer much 
scope for corruption. However, the more extension agents are involved in the distribution of inputs and 
credit or in the enforcement of laws, the greater is the opportunity for corruption. 
Bureaucratic procedures make it difficult for extension agents to respond flexibly to local 
demands, especially in highly centralized systems. Bureaucratic culture is a typical obstacle to the reform 
of public sector agencies. Encouraging processes of institutional learning and change is a major challenge 
in public sector agencies. Likewise, bureaucratic structures often discourage the coordination of 
agricultural extension with other departments. Even links to the agricultural research system are often 
weak in spite of their obvious importance. Farmers may also suffer from attitudinal problems that are 
often widespread in traditional public sector agencies. Rather than treating farmers as clients, customers, 
or citizens, extension agents too often consider them state subjects. Typically, farmers who are poor, 
female, or part of some socially excluded group are particularly affected by attitudinal problems. A 
culture of mistrust (often on all sides) developed from attitudinal problems can also be an obstacle to 
building partnerships with the private sector and civil society organizations. 
Financial sustainability is another problem of public sector extension, especially if cost recovery 
is not pursued. After donor-funded programs end, extension agencies are often left with an increased 
number of agents. Because staff numbers are difficult to reduce in public sector agencies, budget 
reductions limit the resources available to extension agents to do their jobs effectively, such as transport   16
facilities and training. These problems lead to negative feedback. Without sufficient resources, public 
sector extension services become ineffective, and their image of being ineffective leads finance ministries 
to deny requests for more resources. 
Last but not least, public sector extension providers can cause the crowding out of private and 
third sector extension providers. This problem occurs when government agencies provide extension free 
of charge even though no market failure has occurred. Governments may also establish regulatory or 
bureaucratic barriers that prevent private sector extension agencies from emerging. This type of problem, 
however, seems more prevalent in the areas of government-supported input supply and marketing than in 
the actual provision of extension services. Hence, this type of government failure is more likely to affect 
extension services provided by input dealers and output buyers or processors than those provided by 
private extension agencies. 
Strategies to overcome state failures 
One important strategy to address state failures in agricultural extension is to involve NGOs, farmer-
based organizations, and private sector agencies in the management and execution of extension services, 
as discussed in section 4.3. The present section deals with strategies that can be used within the public 
sector to overcome state failures and make extension more demand-driven. These strategies fall into four 
areas: institutional design, funding mechanisms, management approaches, and extension methods. 
Institutional design 
Decentralization is an important strategy to make public agencies more responsive to local needs. 
It can take two forms: devolution, or making public agencies accountable to locally elected governments, 
and deconcentration, or transferring authority to offices at lower levels of government but retaining 
accountability within the line agency (Rondinelli 1981). Decentralization involves its own challenges 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Anderson 2007). Problems of political interest capture and incentives to 
burden extension agents with other tasks may increase after decentralization. If funding responsibilities 
are transferred to local governments, extension may no longer be a priority, especially when basic needs, 
such as water, education, and health, are not being met (Faguet 2004). 
The institutional design of public sector extension agencies can help overcome some of the state 
failures discussed earlier. Increased autonomy for extension agencies can be an important approach to 
reducing political interest capture and limiting opportunities to burden extension agents with tasks outside 
their mandate. The challenge of increased autonomy is “delegatee drift” (Voigt and Salzberger 2002): A 
more autonomous agency may not necessarily pursue the public goals that policymakers intended in 
setting up the agency.   17
Contracting is an important strategy to address state failures by institutional design (Rivera and 
Zijp 2002). In this case, the state continues to finance extension, thus addressing the market failures 
discussed in section 4.1.1, but it can in principle overcome some of the state failures, such as the problem 
of bureaucratic rules and attitudes. Importantly, if contracting is done through competitive bidding, the 
competition mechanism can be used to address some incentive problems. However, contracting involves 
considerable challenges, because the public sector needs to manage the contracting process, which 
involves all the problems inherent in procurement, including corruption. Whether the public sector is 
better able to overcome the state failures inherent in managing its own extension agents than the state 
failures inherent in procurement is an empirical question. 
Funding mechanisms 
The way funding is provided to public sector agencies can affect incentive problems. A mechanism 
widely used in agricultural research, but less so in agricultural extension, is the competitive grant. An 
important strategy to improve both financial sustainability and demand orientation is cost recovery—for 
example, by charging a fee for participation in extension activities. In Table 1, option 5 represents this 
strategy. However, several problems are associated with cost recovery. It may be politically difficult to 
move to a fee-for-extension scheme. The willingness or ability to pay, especially among poor farmers, 
may be constrained by market failures. While having to pay a fee increases farmers’ incentive to hold 
extension providers accountable, it is not necessarily a mechanism that makes extension providers 
accountable to the farmers. In the absence of a market mechanism, it is necessary to establish institutional 
channels by which farmers’ demands are translated into management decisions. As long as farmer-to-
agent ratios are more than 1,000:1, establishing such mechanisms necessarily involves farmer-based 
organizations rather than individual farmers. Such mechanisms have their own challenges, as discussed in 
section 4.3. 
Management approaches 
The public sector can use a range of managerial approaches to address the problem of weak incentives. As 
indicated earlier, merit-based recruitment and promotion is one of the most important strategies in this 
regard. Other instruments include performance contracts and other “managing for results” approaches, 
seeking feedback through client satisfaction surveys, establishing professional standards, and other efforts 
to promote a “mission-oriented” service. The new public management approach aims at introducing a 
range of private sector management techniques to public administration. Because public sector extension 
is typically part of the general public administration, the opportunities to use such instruments are often 
constrained by formal civil service rules and by an informal bureaucratic culture. Changing such formal 
and informal rules for extension in isolation from the rest of the bureaucracy is likely to be difficult. The   18
creation of semiautonomous agencies is one strategy to increase the scope for applying management 
approaches that aim to resolve incentive problems. All these strategies can be considered supply-side 
approaches. Involving farmer-based organizations in the management of extension is an important 
demand-side approach, as discussed in section 4.3. 
Extension methods 
Extension methods differ widely with regard to the scope they create for allowing farmers to articulate 
demand. On one end of the spectrum are transfer-of-technology methods that aim at disseminating new 
technologies developed in research stations, such as lectures and instructions, demonstration plots, and 
information dissemination via radio. Such methods—which were used, for example, in the T&V 
system—leave limited room for the articulation of farmers’ demands. On the other end of the spectrum 
are participatory extension methods, including participatory technology development and the Farmers’ 
Field School approach, which create more space to tailor extension to the demands of farmers (Tripp, 
Wijeratne, and Piyadasa 2005; Davis 2006; Anderson 2007; Van den Berg and Jiggins 2007). One 
challenge often faced by public sector extension agents is that the use of participatory extension methods 
requires the development of specific skills, such as group facilitation. Without investing in training for 
extension agents to develop such skills, it is difficult for the public sector—as for any other extension 
provider—to use the potential inherent in participatory methods. 
4.2.2. Provisions in the Policy Framework for Agricultural Extension 
The framework does not include a systematic description of the state failures the framework seeks to 
address. However, it mentions a range of problems. The challenge of financial sustainability and limited 
operational funds is explicitly mentioned: “States have barely been able to pay the salaries of extension 
personnel. Less than 10 percent of the budget is available for operational expenses, which has practically 
immobilized the service with scarcely any technology dissemination in the field” [3.3.3.1]. In reviewing 
earlier extension approaches, the framework criticizes the “top-down nature of the Training and Visit 
System” and observes that “farmer driven and farmer accountable feedback systems were not adequately 
developed” [2.3]. The framework also acknowledges capacity problems, dedicating an entire section to it. 
On the problem of crowding out, the framework states, “If the public sector continues to subsidize the 
services, this will prevent a ‘level playing field’ to the private sector, which will ultimately get crowded 
out” [3.3.1.8]. The framework also stipulates “a re-examination of existing Rules, Regulations & Acts to 
abolish provisions, which constrain private investment in delivery of agro-services” [3.3.1.8]. 
The following sections discuss the provisions of the framework in the areas of institutional 
design, funding, management, and extension methods.   19
Institutional design 
Decentralization 
The framework places strong emphasis on decentralization, in the form of both deconcentration and 
devolution. The Agricultural Technology Management Agency (ATMA) model is proposed as the key 
concept for decentralizing decision making to the local level. However, the framework itself does not 
provide further specifications of the ATMA model, which was originally introduced under an agricultural 
technology project funded by the World Bank. The explanations presented here are based on project 
documents and other publications (Singh, Swanson, and Singh 2006). Figure 3 describes the structure of 
the ATMA. The governing board comprises the heads of various line departments and research units as 
well as stakeholders—including a cross section of farmers, women, and disadvantaged groups—and 
private sector firms within the district. The Farmer Advisory Block Technology Team comprises 
personnel with extension functions from various departments. The Farmer Advisory Block Technology 
Committee plays a key role in ensuring bottom-up planning. It is composed of the head of the Farmer 
Interest Groups, which are typically organized around specific crops. Farm Information and Advisory 
Centres provide a single-window delivery mechanism for extension. Owing to this setup, the ATMA 
promotes both coordination among government agencies and coordination among the public, private, and 
third sectors. 
Figure 3. Structure of the Agricultural Technology Management Agency (ATMA) 
 
Source: Singh, Swanson, and Singh (2006, 208) 
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In its original design, the ATMA may be considered a model of deconcentration rather than 
devolution because, at least in its original implementation, elected local government leaders were not part 
of its governance structure. However, the framework acknowledges that local governments—specifically, 
India’s three-tier Panchayati Raj Institutions - have started to play a role in extension. As stated in the 
framework, “Some states have also delegated suitable administrative and financial powers to the 
institutions. In these states, the extension personnel are placed under the administrative control of the 
local governments (panchayats), whereas for technical guidance they remain under the control of their 
respective technical line departments” [3.3.3.8]. Accordingly, the framework encourages the development 
of linkages between the ATMA units at village, block, and district levels and the evolving Panchayati Raj 
Institutions. Moreover, as part of the ongoing decentralization process, the Ministry of Agriculture 
expects to discontinue 27 centrally funded programs and reallocate those funds directly to the ATMA 
districts (Swanson 2006). 
Increased autonomy 
The framework suggests the strategy of increased autonomy discussed earlier. The ATMA model ensures 
a considerable degree of independence from the general public administration: The ATMA is a registered 
society, which has much flexibility, for example, to enter into partnership with private sector entities. The 
framework also promotes the principle of increased autonomy for the State Agricultural Management 
Extension Training Institutes by making such autonomy a precondition of support from the central level 
[3.3.5.4]. 
Contracting 
The framework envisages “contracting out of extension services to private-sector, community-based 
organizations or NGOs in selected geographical areas (e.g., a village, cluster of villages, Block)” 
[3.3.3.9]. The framework acknowledges the need for a “transparent, laid out procedure” and for a “strict 
monitoring and evaluation process” [3.3.3.9]. Additionally, the framework points out that extension 
support services, such as security, mobility, and computer and secretarial services should be contracted 
“wherever possible” [3.3.3.11]. In particular, participatory planning should be contracted to NGOs; staff 
training, to universities or institutes; and monitoring, to farmer-based organizations, the Indian Institute of 
Management, and other institutions. Moreover, the framework states that, in contracting arrangements 
among governments, extension services, and farmers, “the farmers could play the role of beneficiaries, 
provider or co-financier of extension services” [3.3.6.3]. 
Related to contracting and the increased roles of the private sector, the media, and information 
technology, the framework stipulates that the public extension service should be made “leaner and   21
professional. It is envisaged that the approximately 100,000 public extension functionaries will be 
gradually reduced to be supported by the other two arms of services providers” [3.3.2.2]. 
Funding mechanisms 
The framework suggests both the establishment of competitive grants and cost recovery mechanisms. It 
envisions a Competitive Agriculture Extension Grant Fund (CAEGF) and suggests that public extension 
agencies compete with private extension agencies for operational funds under such a grant. An 
independent impact evaluation is suggested to assess performance as a basis for subsequent eligibility to 
compete for funds. The Competitive Agriculture Research Grant Fund set up in the Indian Council of 
Agricultural Research and several states is mentioned as a model for the proposed CAEGF [3.3.3.9]. 
The framework encourages cost recovery: “Wherever farmers have the capacity to pay for public 
services, which are in the nature of private goods, realistic cost of such services should be recovered. 
However, provision is made for targeted subsidies to protect the vulnerable class of users” [3.3.9.5]. 
Likewise, the framework states that the private extension providers should charge for extension services 
or, in case of contract farming, recover the costs out of their profit margins [3.3.1.10]. Innovations in 
financial institutions, such as revolving funds, and linking farmers with credit institutions are also 
encouraged by the framework [3.3.9.7]. 
The framework addresses the problem of financial sustainability by suggesting cost-cutting 
mechanisms for extension services: “Cost effectiveness may be improved by relying on fewer but better 
qualified (graduate or post-graduate) field advisers who interact directly with researchers for subject-
matter advice and then multiply their impact in the field by working with farmer groups rather than 
individual contact farmers” [3.3.9.2]. 
Management approaches 
The framework creates the conditions for using incentive-oriented management approaches by increasing 
the autonomy of the extension agencies through the ATMA model, as indicated earlier. It also encourages 
the states to develop human resource development (HRD) policies and action plans by making them a 
precondition for central funding [3.3.5.1]. According to the framework, HRD policies “would also build 
in an effective system of rewards and incentives for public extension functionaries” [3.3.5.1]. However, 
improving merit-based recruitment and promotion and adjusting the pay scale of public sector extension 
agents to create incentives are not specified in the framework. Neither does the framework refer to the 
option of linking HRD reform efforts in extension to those in general public administrations. 
The framework does, however, emphasize capacity strengthening. It stipulates increasing the 
professional qualification of extension staff by suggesting a bachelor of science degree in agriculture as 
the minimum educational requirement for farm advisors. “DOA's extension field staff would be   22
restructured and upgraded to create a professional cadre of Farm Advisors. In the process, the village 
extension worker (VEW) cadre would be incrementally phased out through reassignment and normal 
attrition” [3.3.2.6]. To improve the skills of the extension agents who will remain in the public sector, the 
framework advocates a “massive campaign” comprising a skill gap analysis and compulsory training in 
the form of foundation courses and a professional course [3.3.5.2]. 
Extension methods 
The framework strongly recommends participatory extension approaches by encouraging participation in 
“working out the system description, problem diagnosis, search for appropriate technology, designing the 
process of implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and feedback” [3.3.1.4]. Likewise, the framework 
stresses the role of indigenous knowledge and partnership, highlighting that “the extension agent is no 
longer seen as the expert who has all the useful information and technical solutions; the indigenous 
technical knowledge of farmers and their ingenuity, individually and collectively, are recognized as a 
major source; and solutions to local problems are to be developed in partnership between the extension 
agent and farmers” [3.3.1.4]. The framework also suggests the use of group extension as a mechanism to 
make extension demand-driven. Farmer interest groups should “first generate a demand for information, 
technology and management techniques” [3.3.2.7]. The need for capacity building to enable extension 
agents to use such methods is fully recognized in the framework: “Extension workers therefore need new 
skills of negotiation, conflict resolution and mobilizing and nurturing community organizations” [3.3.1.4]. 
4.3. Third Sector Extension 
As Table 1 indicates, it is useful to distinguish two types of third sector organizations that can be involved 
in agricultural extension: NGOs, especially non-profit service providers, and farmer-based organizations 
(FBOs), which are membership organizations formed by farmers. Whereas NGOs are accountable to their 
funding agencies, FBOs are accountable to their members. Table 1 shows the wide range of options for 
NGOs and FBOs to be involved in the financing and provision of extension. Their involvement can play 
an important role for overcoming the problems of market and state failures. 
4.3.1. Potentials of NGO Extension 
In Table 1, options 3, 7, and 11 through 14 describe the various options by which NGOs can play a role in 
providing and financing agricultural extension. One of the major advantages of NGOs is their flexibility. 
Because they are not part of the public administration, they are not constrained by civil service rules and 
are usually less confined by bureaucratic procedures and cultures. Therefore, they can use a range of 
managerial approaches to create incentives for their staff, such as merit-based and competitive payment,   23
which are often not available to the public sector. Depending on its type, an NGO may be in a better 
position to attract staff members who are intrinsically motivated and dedicated to its cause. Moreover, an 
NGO is not usually subject to the problem of political interest capture and is typically less likely to be 
under pressure to assume responsibilities outside the mandate of agricultural extension. NGOs have often 
played a pioneering role in introducing group-based and participatory extension methods. In contracting 
systems (option 3 in Table 1), NGOs may compete among themselves or with for-profit private sector 
providers, which may create additional incentives for improved service provision. 
4.3.2. Potentials of FBO Extension 
In Table 1, options 4, 8, and 14 through 17 refer to extension approaches that involve FBOs. FBOs have 
important advantages, especially for smallholder agriculture. As mentioned earlier, the farmer-to-agent 
ratio in most developing countries is more than 1,000:1. Hence, it is difficult for farmers to exercise 
demand and hold service providers accountable without some form of organization. FBOs can play an 
important role in aggregating farmers’ demands for extension and in representing farmers in participatory 
models of extension management. For example, FBOs can represent farmers in developing plans for 
extension. They can also represent farmers on procurement boards charged with contracting extension 
providers and can participate in multistakeholder management boards. Moreover, FBOs can help reduce 
the transaction costs of providing extension, as in group-based extension approaches. FBOs can partner 
with public sector agencies as well as NGO service providers to make extension more demand-driven. An 
important advantage of FBOs is the fact that they are, in principle, directly accountable to the farmers 
who are their members. 
4.3.3. NGO Failures in Agricultural Extension: Theoretical Considerations 
Reasons for NGO failures 
When NGOs work in the absence of a market mechanism, they are, in principle, subject to the same types 
of information problems as the public sector (see section 4.1.1). They are usually small compared with 
public sector agencies. Although their size contributes to their flexibility, it also reduces their outreach. In 
fact, the percentage of farmers who are reached by NGO extension is often small. As indicated in Figure 
1, NGOs constituted an information source for less than 1 percent of Indian farmers. Some NGOs have 
grown to a considerable size, such as BRAC in Bangladesh.
3 However, the larger an NGO becomes, the 
more likely it will become subject to the same problems of bureaucracy faced by public sector agencies.  
                                                      
3 BRAC employs more than 90,000 people. See http://www.brac.net/about.htm.    24
Moreover, NGOs are subject to accountability problems (Ebrahim 2003). In principle, public 
sector agencies can be made accountable to farmers through political channels. NGOs are only 
accountable to their funding agencies. They often face problems of financial sustainability and have to 
cope with considerable fluctuations in funding. Moreover, NGOs are not immune to problems of 
mismanagement and misuse of funding. Neither are they immune to attitudinal problems. While NGO 
staff would not treat farmers as “state subjects,” they might become patronizing toward those they serve. 
Additionally, they can have incentives to combine extension with other goals, including promoting the 
worldview or religion with which the NGO is associated. Frequently, NGOs do not have their own 
extension staff but use public sector extension agents (option 11 in Table 1). If this fact is neglected, their 
contribution to increasing the supply of extension services is easily overestimated. 
Strategies to overcome NGO failures 
To overcome the challenges they face, NGOs can to some extent use the same strategies discussed earlier 
for public sector agencies. For example, NGOs can use participatory extension methods and involve 
FBOs in extension management to solve information problems. Likewise, they can use the same types of 
managerial approaches mentioned earlier for the public sector, such as making use of client satisfaction 
surveys and focusing on results-based management. NGOs also can use cost-recovery methods, such as 
fee-based extension, to improve financial sustainability and increase farmers’ incentives to demand 
accountability (option 7 in Table 1). 
4.3.4. FBO Failures in Agricultural Extension: Theoretical Considerations 
Reasons for FBO failures 
A major challenge for FBOs is the classical problem of collective action. If the benefits of FBO action are 
“nonexcludable,” farmers have limited incentives to incur the transaction costs of participating in an FBO 
(the “free rider” problem). The incentives to join local farmer groups for the purpose of group-based 
extension may be rather high, because the participants expect to benefit directly from their participation. 
However, to participate in extension planning and management beyond the district level, farmers need to 
become organized at a more aggregate level, which poses its own challenges. The literature on the role of 
group size and heterogeneity in collective action is extensive, and the relations continue to be debated 
(e.g., Poteete and Ostrom 2004). In any case, it is a common phenomenon that organizations formed for 
donor-funded projects collapse once project funding ends. 
FBOs are not equally suited for all kinds of extension. They have particular comparative 
advantages to facilitate extension for activities that require collective action, such as many types of 
natural resource management. Where more farm-specific advice is required, their comparative advantage 
is lower.   25
A major challenge of FBOs is avoiding social exclusion and elite capture. FBOs are often 
dominated by middle-class and wealthy farmers. Poor farmers and socially marginalized groups typically 
play a limited role in the leadership of FBOs, even if they are members. Moreover, the representation of 
women in FBOs is often low, a problem linked to the sociocultural role of women in most societies as 
well as to the time constraints faced by women (see, e.g., Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen 1998; 
Quisumbing 2003). 
Importantly, FBOs are often confronted with capacity problems, particularly when they become 
service providers and hire extension agents. This requires skills in management, accounting, and 
supervision. If FBOs want to access high-value markets and export markets, capacity challenges are 
particularly pronounced. Depending on their size and activities, FBOs may choose to hire professional 
managers, a practice that compounds supervision problems. In addition, FBOs that hire professionals 
confront some of the same problems NGOs face. For example, they are not immune to mismanaging 
funds. Agricultural extension is not necessarily a priority for FBOs. Lobbying for state support in the 
form of subsidies is often a higher priority than helping their members become more competitive. If FBOs 
become large, they are also likely to become subject to political interest capture, because politicians have 
incentives to use them for mobilizing votes. Likewise, leaders of large FBOs may have incentives to run 
for political office, which in turn may lead to conflicts of interest. 
Strategies to overcome FBO failures 
FBOs are rarely founded for the purpose of agricultural extension alone. Extension may be one activity in 
commodity-based FBOs, such as dairy cooperatives or vegetable grower associations. Integrating 
extension into FBOs that are founded for a broader set of goals is an important strategy to reduce the 
transaction costs of collective action. 
Investment in the managerial capacity of FBOs through training can be an important strategy to 
overcome the management challenges they face. The dairy cooperatives in India, for example, have a high 
capacity to provide services to their members because of specific investments in their capacity by the 
National Dairy Development Board. Leadership training is also a promising strategy, because meeting the 
collective action problem requires vision and leadership. Networking, which allows FBOs to learn from 
each other, is another approach to overcoming FBO failures. One strategy to deal with the elite capture 
and social exclusion problem is the formation of specialized organizations, such as a group exclusively 
for women farmers. Institutional design can also help to address some of the problems faced by FBOs. 
For example, women and disadvantaged groups may be allocated seats in participatory planning and 
management boards for extension. 
In developing strategies to overcome FBO failures, it is important to keep in mind that donors and 
the public sector can play only limited roles. Ultimately, the formation of sustainable FBOs requires a   26
process of social mobilization in which the farmers themselves have to play the lead role. Donor-funded 
initiatives can only serve as catalysts. Importantly, the state needs to create the fundamental conditions 
that allow FBOs to thrive, such as a conducive legal environment and safeguards against political capture. 
4.3.5. Provisions in the Policy Framework for Agricultural Extension 
NGO extension 
The framework foresees an important role for NGOs. It highlights their “ability to mobilize communities 
into Farmers Organizations/Farmer Interest Groups/Watershed Associations/Market Associations” as a 
major strength [3.3.3.6]. According to the framework, NGOs can either complement public sector 
extension by focusing on community mobilization or substitute for public extension through contracting 
approaches. The central government is also accorded a role in partnering with NGOs. As the framework 
states, of the then 261 Farmer Information and Advisory Centres in the country, 86 were operated by 
NGOs [3.3.3.6].  
The framework also proposes the use of public funding for capacity building of NGOs: “A 
systematic training, capacity building and technical backstopping mechanism, supported through public 
funds is to be developed for NGOs involved in providing extension services” [3.3.3.6]. Apart from 
acknowledging the need to provide training, however, the framework does not refer to the challenges 
involved in NGO extension or to strategies to deal with those challenges. 
FBO extension 
The framework identifies FBOs as a major mechanism to make extension services demand-driven. It 
defines several types of FBOs, including self-help groups, farmer interest groups, and commodity 
associations [3.3.1.5]. The framework emphasizes that FBOs can provide “an effective channel for both 
the dissemination of technology” to large numbers of small and marginal farmers, and feedback to 
research and extension [3.3.1.5] and points out that they are especially important “for high value 
commodities and resource poor farmers” [3.3.2.3].Based on the ATMA model, FBOs play a key role in 
this extension approach. 
The question of how to promote the formation of FBOs is addressed in the framework in various 
ways. First, the framework points out that government services can help identify and strengthen existing 
associations or cooperatives of farmers [3.3.10.4]. Likewise, as mentioned earlier, NGOs’ support in the 
formation and mobilization of FBOs is encouraged. The framework also foresees the use of public funds 
to support the formation of FBOs and their involvement in extension planning, implementation, and 
monitoring [3.3.1.5, 3.3.1.9]. Linking FBOs to local governments through existing institutions such as 
land management committees and federating FBOs at higher levels is also encouraged by the framework. 
The “internalization” of extension services by FBOs is cited as an “ultimate aim” [3.3.3.5]. These   27
suggestions correspond to options 8 and 17 in Table 1. The framework also considers FBOs a major 
avenue of farmer integration with agribusiness and considers “support to farmers’ organizations” as 
“perhaps the main single input that governments can provide” in this regard [3.3.10.4]. 
Although the framework addresses the collective action problem inherent in forming FBOs, it 
does not outline strategies to encourage small and marginalized farmers or female farmers to join FBOs. 
Likewise, the problem of local elite capture in FBOs is not addressed.   28
5.  DISCUSSION 
5.1. Making Agricultural Extension Demand-Driven 
Section 4 identified various strategies to make extension demand-driven. Before discussing the relevance 
of the strategies to India’s agricultural extension policies, it may be useful to summarize them. Three 
types of extension were distinguished: private sector (market based), public sector, and third sector. In 
private sector extension systems, it is the market mechanism that fosters demand-driven services. If a 
market for extension does not exist because government interventions have “crowded out” private 
extension providers, reducing such crowding out and creating a favorable investment climate for private 
providers is one strategy to make extension more demand-driven. To what extent crowding out, rather 
than other types of market failures, prevents the emergence of a market for extension is an empirical 
question. Besides the “pure” type of market-based extension where private sector organizations provide 
extension services and farmers pay for them (option 6 in Table 1), other market-based approaches include 
agricultural advice provided with the sale of inputs or purchase of products and advice provided in a 
contract-farming relationship. How demand-driven these approaches are depends largely on the 
bargaining power of the farmers in these relations. 
Public sector extension is often not responsive to farmers’ demands owing to a range of 
government failures. Strategies to make public sector extension more responsive to farmers’ demands 
include decentralization of extension agencies, increased autonomy of extension agencies, contracting 
extension services and involving farmers in awarding the contracts, using funding mechanisms such as 
cost recovery to encourage farmers to express their demands, using management techniques such as new 
public management to emphasize responsiveness to clients, and using participatory extension methods. 
Extension services provided by NGOs and FBOs (third sector extension) are not necessarily 
demand-driven either, because they are subject to various failures, too. The strategies to make NGO-
based extension more responsive to farmers’ demands are similar to those that the public sector can use. 
Strategies to make FBO-based extension more demand-driven include strengthening management 
capacity and the internal accountability mechanisms of FBOs, with a specific focus on overcoming 
problems of elite capture and social exclusion. Because FBOs can play an important role in making other 
types of extension more demand-driven and accountable, strengthening the capacity of FBOs to articulate 
farmers’ demands is an important crosscutting strategy. 
Each available strategy to make agricultural extension more demand-driven has its own 
challenges. In view of these challenges, the choice of strategies depends on underlying assumptions and 
value judgments, or paradigms, regarding the roles that the public sector, the private sector, and civil 
society should play in agricultural development and, more broadly, in economic development. The Policy   29
Framework for Agricultural Extension represents the paradigm of public sector reform that emerged in 
the “post–Washington Consensus” era (Williamson 2000). This paradigm acknowledges the role of the 
state in overcoming market failure, but it envisions a facilitating and enabling role for the state 
(Wolfensohn and Bourguignon 2004).  
When privatization is not possible, outsourcing is considered a major solution, and cost-recovery 
is a central element of the paradigm outlined in the framework. Other core elements are user participation, 
accountability, and demand-driven services. Subsidies are accepted but only if targeted to the poor and to 
marginalized groups. Reforms within the public sector receive comparatively little attention the paradigm, 
based on an implicit scepticism regarding the ability of the public sector to reinvent itself.  
The spirit and the language used in the framework are remarkably similar to international 
documents that reflect this paradigm. For example, the 2004 World Development Report on public 
service provision promotes similar strategies of contracting, cost recovery, client empowerment, and 
avoiding the “crowding out” of nongovernmental providers (World Bank 2004). Because the framework 
has not been translated into laws at the state level, it remains unknown, however, whether it would have 
been approved by elected political decision makers in this form, and which of the different elements 
would have been contested by different political parties. However, the framework can certainly be 
considered a bold approach to reforming extension services in India. 
5.2. Has Extension in India Become More Demand-Driven? 
The framework was obviously inspired by the reform experience of the ATMA model. Studies evaluating 
the impact of the pilot operations have not focused on the question of whether extension has become more 
demand-driven, but according to various unpublished World Bank project documents, they have 
demonstrated encouragingly positive results. In the 28 districts in which the ATMA model was 
implemented under an agricultural technology project financed by the World Bank, the following 
increases in cropped areas were reported for the 1999–2003 period: horticulture, 12–16 percent; oil seeds, 
3–11 percent; herbs and medicinal crops, 1–5 percent. Cereal areas declined from 55 percent to 47 
percent, but importantly, yields increased 14 percent. Recorded farm income increased an average of 24 
percent in project districts compared with 5 percent in other districts; this increase is statistically and 
surely economically significant if it can be sustained when the project is scaled up. However, collection of 
more broad-based geographic data and careful comparisons with remaining nonproject cases are needed 
to substantiate these results (Anderson 2007). 
So far, the extent to which extension in India has changed on a broad scale since the framework 
was implemented remains unclear. India’s 10th Five-Year Plan stipulates expanding the ATMA model to 
252 districts and extending it to all of India’s 600 rural districts during the 11th Plan (Swanson 2006). No   30
nationwide representative survey, similar to the 2003 Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers (NSSO 
2005) is available to describe the current situation. According to extension experts, private sector 
participation in extension has increased because of growing exports and quality considerations, but the 
role of public-private partnerships has made little progress. Insufficient recruitment has reduced the 
number of public sector extension personnel, leaving especially remote areas poorly served. Technology 
dissemination has apparently remained the major goal of public sector extension, and evaluation systems 
still focus on indicators such as the number of trainings conducted or the area covered by modern 
varieties.
4 
Results from a survey of farmer households conducted by the Institute for Social and Economic 
Change (ISEC) and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) on decentralization and 
public service provision in Karnataka provide some additional glimpses (Sekher et al. 2007).
5 Twenty-
two percent of the 966 farmer households surveyed said they had at least one contact with a government 
extension worker during the past year, a significant increase over the average of 11.5 percent reported for 
Karnataka in the 2003 Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers (NSSP 2005). However, the most 
important problem reported by the respondents in the ISEC-IFPRI survey was that the “extension worker 
does not visit the village” (76 percent) or “does not visit the village regularly” (18 percent). As in the 
Situation Assessment Survey respondents to the ISEC-IFPRI survey were either very satisfied (51 
percent) or somewhat satisfied (27 percent) with the knowledge provided by the extension agent. Group 
extension had apparently not become widespread in the survey area, because only 15 percent of all 
extension interactions were group based. To collect information on accountability and demand 
orientation, respondents were asked whom, if anyone, they contact to report problems. Ninety-four 
percent of survey participants who answered this question reported that they had not contacted anyone. 
Most respondents who had contacted someone had turned to a local government official. These findings 
suggest that the task of establishing functioning channels for demand-driven extension remains largely 
unfinished. 
The insights from the Situation Assessment Survey and the Karnataka survey raise the question of 
how well the Policy Framework for Agricultural Extension is focused on the major problems of public 
sector extension in India. The framework’s emphasis on capacity strengthening and on increasing the 
professional qualification of extension agents suggests that the quality of the knowledge provided by the 
extension agents is a major problem. Market-oriented extension and farm diversification certainly require 
                                                      
4 R.V. Sulaiman, personal communication, July 2007. 
5 For this study, 80 gram panchayats (lowest tier of local government) in Karnataka were selected through stratified random 
sampling. The criterion for stratification was the classification of the state into three areas based on economic development 
criteria. The classification was developed by the Government of Karnataka using multiple criteria. Among the 80 panchayats, 
100 villages and 966 households were selected using simple random sampling.    31
an upgrade in the knowledge of extension agents. However, the empirical evidence suggests that farmers 
presently perceive access to extension to be a more important limitation. 
In this regard, the question arises as to what would be an appropriate level of access in the Indian 
context. On the one hand, a low coverage may be a normal feature in agricultural extension, because 
extension agents cannot interact with all farmers and technology diffusion relies on the spread of 
information among farmers. Given that the most important source for information about new technologies 
is “other progressive farmers” (nearly 17 percent, as shown in Figure 1) this mechanism works to a 
considerable extent. However, the low percentage of farmers who interact with government extension 
workers (nearly 6 percent, as shown Figure 1) may point to the problem of “absenteeism,” which is quite 
widespread in other areas of public service provision in India, such as health and education (World Bank 
2007a). 
It may be useful to compare this extension contact percentage with data from statistically 
representative surveys from other countries. For example, the Service Delivery and Satisfaction Survey 
III conducted in Malawi found that an average of 46 percent of farmers interacted with extension workers 
(Malawi Economic Justice Network 2006). Uganda’s National Service Delivery Survey conducted in 
2004 found that 14 percent of farmer households had been visited by extension workers within 12 months 
before the survey compared with about 29 percent reported in Uganda’s 2000 survey (UBOS 2004). 
Considering that both countries are at a lower level of economic development than India, the figure of 6 
percent from the Indian survey does indicate a low outreach of public extension services. Hence, it is an 
important question for further research whether the strategy proposed in the framework—to reduce the 
number of public sector extension personnel in combination with promoting group-based extension and 
private sector providers—will be effective in improving farmers’ access to extension services in India. 
Challenges Still to Be Met 
The analysis in section 4 points to some further challenges that must be met for extension to become 
demand-driven. It is surprising that the framework does not address the challenges faced by FBOs 
regarding elite capture and exclusion, especially in view of the large role that the framework accords 
these organizations. In India, hierarchical local power relations are widespread. Members of scheduled 
castes and tribes face social and economic exclusion. Hence, special provisions to make sure that they are 
adequately represented in FBOs would have been justified in the framework to make sure that these 
groups’ demands for extension are equally considered. The same concern applies to women (Rangnekar 
2006). The framework places strong emphasis on mainstreaming women in agriculture and proposes a 
wide range of measures to increase women’s access to services [3.3.7]. However, the proposed measures 
mostly target the supply side of extension—for example, by promoting gender-sensitivity training for   32
extension agents and increasing the number of female extension staff. Special provisions to strengthen 
women’s ability to demand extension services are surprisingly absent in the framework. The design of the 
ATMA model envisages the representation of women and disadvantaged groups in the district-level 
governing board (Singh, Swanson, and Singh 2006), but such provisions are not mentioned in the 
framework. 
As mentioned in section 4.2.2, the framework pays comparatively little attention to the challenges 
inherent in reforming public sector extension agencies, in creating incentives for the staff who continue to 
be employed by the public sector, and in changing bureaucratic cultures and promoting institutional 
learning and change (Sulaiman and Hall 2002). Although the framework acknowledges the need for 
public sector involvement in serving the poor and reaching remote areas, important challenges to 
achieving this goal, such as creating incentives for qualified staff to serve in remote areas, are not 
addressed. The framework emphasizes reform elements that are in line with the post–Washington 
Consensus paradigm, such as contracting and competitive grants, but little empirical evidence exists to 
show the circumstances under which these approaches improve extension services. 
Given the size and diversity of India, it is also surprising that the framework does not place more 
emphasis on the need to tailor solutions to specific circumstances. What works to make extension 
demand-driven in Andhra Pradesh, for instance, may not work in Bihar. The framework seems to assume 
that ATMA-type approaches are the best solutions under all circumstances, even though there is some 
evidence that the ATMA model did not work equally well in all districts where it was piloted (Sulaiman 
2003). An institutional analysis to determine the reasons for the variable performance (what worked and 
what did not and why) was not conducted, and the different states face different challenges to fit the 
model into their institutional structures.
6 Other interesting reform approaches are available, such as the 
Kerala Horticultural Development Program, from which important lessons on extension reform could be 
derived (Sulaiman and Hall 2004). Evidence from public sector reform in general, and from extension 
reform in particular, suggests the need to move from “one size fits all” to “best fit” approaches (Levy and 
Kpundeh 2004; Birner et al. 2006; Anderson 2007). Moreover, as analysis of the Indian extension system 
has pointed out, a focus on experimentation and learning is essential to improving agricultural extension 
in India (Sulaiman 2003). 
                                                      
6 R.V. Sulaiman, personal communication, July 2007.   33
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Agricultural extension is back on the global development agenda, and reform measures are being actively 
pursued in many parts of the developing world. India is an important case to watch because of its long-
standing commitment to supporting the vital role of extension in agricultural development. Moreover, 
India is a major reformer, with many exciting innovations fostering improved service provision and 
agricultural outcomes. But the process is thus far incomplete, not only in implementation but also in 
policy analysis. We have endeavoured to identify some important gaps in analysis and some key issues 
that still need to be addressed. This is a time for agricultural policymakers to reflect afresh on the unmet 
demands, implicit and explicit, for provision of agricultural extension services to all of India’s deserving 
farmers. 
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